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Abstract
We consider a classic rendezvous game where two players try to meet each other on a set of n
locations. In each round, every player visits one of the locations and the game nishes when the players
meet at the same location. The goal is to devise strategies for both players that minimize the expected
waiting time till the rendezvous.
In the asymmetric case, when the strategies of the players may dier, it is known that the optimum
expected waiting time of n+12 is achieved by the wait-for-mommy pair of strategies, where one of the
players stays at one location for n rounds, while the other player searches through all the n locations in
a random order. However, if we insist that the players are symmetric — they are expected to follow
the same strategy — then the best known strategy, proposed by Anderson and Weber [6], achieves an
asymptotic expected waiting time of 0.829n.
We show that the symmetry requirement indeed implies that the expected waiting time needs to
be asymptotically larger than in the asymmetric case. Precisely, we prove that for every n > 2, if the
players need to employ the same strategy, then the expected waiting time is at least n+12 + εn, where
ε = 2−36.
∗This work is a part of project TOTAL (Mi. Pilipczuk) that have received funding from the European Research Council (ERC)
under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No. 677651). It is also partially
funded by the French ANR projects ANR-16-CE40-0023 (DESCARTES) and ANR-17-CE40-0015 (DISTANCIA).
†CNRS, LaBRI, Université de Bordeaux, France, marthe.bonamy@u-bordeaux.fr.
‡Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw, Poland, michal.pilipczuk@mimuw.edu.pl.
§Centre national de la recherche scientique, CSTB (ICube), Strasbourg, France, sereni@kam.mff.cuni.cz.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
03
76
4v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
0 F
eb
 20
20
1 Introduction
Rendezvous search questions fall within the long-established eld of search games: instead of having a
player searching for an otherwise indierent treasure, there are now two players that want to meet as
quickly as possible. This very natural problem lends itself to a number of very dierent, more or less
formalised settings. It was rst specied as an optimisation problem in 1976 by Alpern at the end of a talk
(see [2]), in two dierent settings: the astronaut problem and the seemingly simpler telephone problem. In
the former problem, two players are on a sphere, each with a given unit walking speed and no common
orientation in space, and they want to minimise their expected meeting time. The telephone problem has
since been rephrased as a rendezvous game on discrete locations, as follows. Two players wish to meet on a
set of n locations and they proceed in rounds. In each round, every player visits a location of her choice.
The game nishes when both players meet at the same location. The goal of the players is to minimize the
expected waiting time till a meet-up, also called a rendezvous. This formulation permits to easily impose
extra constraints on how the players can move from one location to another by using dierent underlying
space topologies (which here are graphs: in the original telephone problem, the underlying graph is the
complete graph on n vertices). The most studied cases are when the graph is either complete or a path.
Let us point out that, originally, no dierence between the two players is assumed here, so that they
must use the same strategy: this is called the symmetric case. It implies a level of randomness, as otherwise
the players may well never meet. The case where the players are allowed to use dierent strategies, called
asymmetric, was introduced in 1995 [1].
As pointed out earlier, for instance by Alpern [2], such a natural question can be raised in a number
of dierent contexts, such as that of migrating animals. There is a rich research literature on rendezvous
games and its many variants, e.g. with more players [5], dierent rules of the game (for instance seeking to
minimise the second meeting time [10]) or other topologies of the search space (including when the players
know where they start from, that is, when they have a common labelling of the graph [3]). We invite an
interested reader to the survey of Alpern [2] for a broader and formal introduction.
Coming back to the rendezvous game on the complete graph, the asymmetric case was solved by
Anderson and Weber [6], using what is coined the wait-for-mommy strategy: one of the players stays for n
rounds in one location, while the other player searches through all the n locations in a random order. Then
the expected waiting time is equal to n+12 , and it is known that this value is optimum [6]: every pair of
strategies for the players yields expected waiting time not lower than n+12 .
Apart from proving the aforementioned lower bound of n+12 in the asymmetric case, Anderson and
Weber [6] also studied the symmetric variant of the problem, where the two players are required to use the
same strategy. While always visiting a random location gives an expected waiting time of n, Anderson
and Weber proposed a more clever symmetric strategy that achieves an asymptotic expected waiting time
slightly smaller than 0.829n, which we explain next.
The Anderson-Weber strategy works as follows. Let θ ∈ [0, 1] be a parameter, to be xed later. The
players divide the game into groups of n− 1 consecutive rounds. At the beginning of each group of rounds,
each player randomly decides her behavior during these rounds: with probability θ she will stay in a random
location for all n− 1 rounds, and with probability 1− θ she will visit n− 1 locations chosen at random, and
in a random order. Thus, intuitively, the Anderson-Weber strategy tries to break the symmetry by randomly
assigning to each player either the role of the baby (who is passive), or the role of the mommy (who is
active). However, there is a signicant probability that both players get the same role, which results in an
expected waiting time signicantly higher than n+12 . Indeed, while for dierent n, dierent values of θ
optimize the expected waiting time, with n tending to innity one should pick θ tending to roughly 0.24749,
which results in an asymptotic expected waiting time slightly smaller than 0.829n.
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The Anderson-Weber strategy has been analyzed for small values of n. It is known that picking the
right θ yields an optimum strategy for n = 2 [6] and for n = 3 [9], this latter result being much more
dicult to prove. For n = 4, as proved by Weber [8] there is a slightly better strategy outside of the
framework of Anderson and Weber. However, in general it is conjectured that the Anderson-Weber strategy
is asymptotically optimum: there is no strategy for arbitrary n that would yield an asymptotic expected
waiting time smaller than (roughly) 0.829n. However, to the best of our knowledge, no asymptotic lower
bound higher than n+12 , which holds even for the asymmetric variant, was known prior to this work.
Our contribution. We prove that for every n > 2, in the symmetric rendezvous game on n locations
the expected waiting time needs to be signicantly larger than n+12 . Precisely, if the players are requested
to follow the same strategy, then whatever strategy they choose, the expected waiting time will be at
least n+12 + εn for ε = 2−36. See Theorem 1 in Section 2 for a formal statement. While this still leaves a
large gap to the best known upper bound of 0.829n, due to Anderson and Weber [6], this seems to be the
rst lower bound for arbitrary n that signicantly distinguishes the symmetric case from the asymmetric
case, where n+12 is the optimum.
The idea behind our proof can be explained as follows. As in other works, e.g. [9], we restrict the game
to the rst n rounds and prove a lower bound already for this simpler game. We classify deterministic
strategies of the players (which we call tactics) into those that rather stay at few locations and those that seek
through many locations. Formally, tactics of the rst kind — the passive tactics — visit at most n/2 dierent
locations, while tactics of the second kind — the active tactics — visit more than n/2 dierent locations.
The intuition drawn from the asymmetric case is that the expected waiting time is minimized when
one player plays a passive tactic, while the other plays an active tactic. As now the players need to follow
the same strategy (understood as a probability distribution over tactics), with probability at least 12 they
choose to use tactics of the same kind (activity level). Then it suces to prove that when two tactics of the
same kind are played against each other, the expected waiting time is signicantly larger than n+12 .
To this end, we show that if same-kind tactics are employed, the probability that no rendezvous happens
at all is bounded from below by a positive constant. This easily implies a better-than-n+12 lower bound on
the expected waiting time. To analyze the probability of no rendezvous, we investigate a random variableX
that indicates the total number of rendezvous if the game is not stopped when the players meet for the rst
time. Then X has mean (roughly) equal to 1, so to prove that X = 0 with signicant probability, we show
that X is not well concentrated around its mean. This involves establishing a lower bound on the variance
of X , which in turn follows from the assumption that the employed tactics have the same kind.
2 The model and the problem
In this section we formalize the considered rendezvous search game and state the main result in precise
terms. As in previous works, e.g. [9], we make the game nite by stopping it after n rounds. Precisely, if the
players did not meet after n rounds, we stop the game and set n+ 1 as the obtained time till rendezvous.
Note that this may only decrease the expected waiting time as compared to allowing the players to play
indenitely.
We are given a set of n locations and two players,A andB. Each player has her own, private numbering
of locations using numbers from [n] := {1, . . . , n}. A tactic for a player is a function τ : [n] → [n],
where τ(i) is interpreted as the index of the location that the player intends to visit at round i, in her own
numbering. A strategy for a player is a probability distribution σ over the tactics of this player. Note that
the set of possible tactics is nite, hence we may use the discrete σ-eld where every subset of tactics
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is measurable. The sets of tactics and strategies for the game on n locations are denoted by Θn and Σn,
respectively.
For two given strategies σA and σB , the game is played as follows:
• Players A and B respectively draw their tactics τA and τB from the strategies σA and σB at random.
• A permutation pi : [n]→ [n] that matches the numberings of locations ofA andB is drawn uniformly
at random. This permutation pi will be called the binding.
• The waiting time till rendezvous is indicated by the random variable
T 〈σ1, σ2〉 = min ({ i : pi(τA(i)) = τB(i) } ∪ {n+ 1}) .
Then the question of minimizing the waiting time till rendezvous for symmetric players corresponds to the
problem of minimizing the expected value of T 〈σA, σB〉 over the strategies σA and σB , subject to σA = σB .
Note that in this model, we assume that every player xes her tactic at the beginning of the game and
then follows this tactic. Observe that this does not restrict the players in any way, as throughout the play
they receive no information that could inuence the choice of the next moves. Indeed, when entering a
location, the player only receives the information that the other player is not there, or otherwise the game
immediately nishes. Hence, there is no point in considering adaptativity in strategies.
The main result of this work can be now phrased as follows.
Theorem 1. There exists ε > 0 such that for every n > 2 and every strategy σ ∈ Σn, we have
ET 〈σ, σ〉 > n+ 12 + εn.
In the proof of Theorem 1 we will use the lower bound for the waiting time for asymmetric strategies of
Anderson and Weber [6]. Note that the proof of this result also holds for the game stopped after round n.
Theorem 2 (Anderson and Weber [6]). For every n ∈ N and pair of strategies σA, σB ∈ Σn, we have
ET 〈σA, σB〉 > n+ 12 .
As mentioned in Section 1, the lower bound provided by Theorem 2 is tight, as witnessed by the
wait-for-mommy pair of strategies: σA is the baby strategy that deterministically picks a tactic that maps
all integers i ∈ [n] to 1, while σB is the mommy strategy that deterministically picks the identity function
as the tactic.
3 Proof of Theorem 1
For the rest of the proof we x the number of locations n to be at least 2. For brevity we write Θ := Θn
and Σ := Σn.
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3.1 Passive and active tactics
Let us start by taking a closer look at the mapping σA, σB 7→ ET 〈σA, σB〉, where σA, σB ∈ Σ. We shall
try to understand this mapping from the point of view of linear algebra.
For tactics τA, τB ∈ Θ, let
W (τA, τB) := E [min ({ i : pi(τA(i)) = τB(i) } ∪ {n+ 1})] .
Note that here, the tactics τA, τB are xed and the expectation is taken only over the choice of the binding pi.
Let us dene a bilinear operator
Φ: RΘ × RΘ → R as Φ〈x, y〉 :=
∑
τA,τB∈Θ
W (τA, τB) · xτAyτB ,
where x, y ∈ RΘ are vectors indexed by the elements of Θ. Then
ET 〈σA, σB〉 = Φ〈a, b〉,
where a, b ∈ RΘ are such that aτ is the probability of drawing τ in the distribution σA, and similarly for bτ .
The main idea is as follows. As witnessed by the tightness example for Theorem 2, the operator Φ〈·, ·〉
achieves its minimum possible value when the strategies σA and σB are sort of “orthogonal”. Namely, one
strategy should focus on baby-like tactics — being in a few locations and waiting for the other player —
while the other strategy should focus on mommy-like tactics — seeking through a large number of location
in search of the other player. Playing a baby-like tactic against a mommy-like tactic yields low waiting
time, while the intuition is that playing two baby-like tactics against each other, or two mommy-like tactics
against each other, should result in waiting time signicantly larger than n+12 . When the two players are
forced to use the same strategy, there is a signicant probability — at least 12 — that they end up playing
tactics of the same kind. This increases the expected waiting time signicantly above n+12 .
We now formalize this intuition, calling baby-like tactics passive and mommy-like tactics active.
Denition 3. A tactic τ ∈ Θ is called passive if |τ([n])| 6 n/2 and active otherwise. The sets of passive
and active tactics are denoted by ΘA and ΘP, respectively.
In the next sections we will focus on the following lemma.
Lemma 4. There exists δ > 0 such that for all τA, τB ∈ Θ satisfying either τA, τB ∈ ΘA or τA, τB ∈ ΘP,
we have
W (τA, τB) >
n+ 1
2 + δn.
Before we proceed to prove Lemma 4, let us see how Theorem 1 follows from it.
Proof (of Theorem 1 assuming Lemma 4). We rst note that from Theorem 2 applied to two deterministic
strategies we may infer that
W (τA, τB) >
n+ 1
2 for all τA, τB ∈ Θ. (1)
Let a ∈ RΘ be such that aτ is the probability that tactic τ is drawn by the strategy σ. Write
a = aP + aA,
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where the supports of aP and aA are passive and active tactics, respectively. As W (·, ·) is a symmetric
function, we have
ET 〈σ, σ〉 = Φ〈a, a〉 = Φ〈aP, aP〉+ Φ〈aA, aA〉+ 2 · Φ〈aP, aA〉. (2)
Let p := ∑τ∈ΘA aτ be the probability that σ yields a passive tactic. Then, by Lemma 4, we have
Φ〈aP, aP〉 =
∑
τA,τB∈ΘA
W (τA, τB) · aτAaτB
>
(
n+ 1
2 + δn
)
·
∑
τA,τB∈ΘA
aτAaτB = p2 ·
(
n+ 1
2 + δn
)
. (3)
Using Lemma 4 again, we analogously infer that
Φ〈aA, aA〉 > (1− p)2 ·
(
n+ 1
2 + δn
)
. (4)
A similar computation using (1) yields that
Φ〈aP, aA〉 > p(1− p) · n+ 12 . (5)
Finally, letting ε := δ/2 we can combine (2), (3), (4), and (5) to conclude that
ET 〈σ, σ〉 > (p2 + (1− p)2 + 2p(1− p)) · n+ 12 + p
2 · δ · n+ (1− p)2 · δ · n
= n+ 12 + 2ε · (p
2 + (1− p)2) · n > n+ 12 + εn,
where the last inequality follows from the convexity of the function x 7→ x2. 
It thus remains to prove Lemma 4.
3.2 High probability of no rendezvous gives high expected waiting time
We now start analyzing the game when played between a xed pair of tactics, with the goal of establishing
lower bounds for the expected waiting time till a rendezvous. The intuition is that this waiting time should
be signicantly higher than n+12 provided the probability that during the n rounds of the game there is no
rendezvous at all is bounded from below by some positive constant. This is made formal in the following
lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose τA, τB ∈ Θ are such that
P (τA(pi(i)) 6= τB(i) for all i ∈ [n]) > β
for some constant β > 0. Then
W (τA, τB) >
n+ 1
2 +
β2
2 · n.
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Proof. Let Z be the random variable dened as the waiting time till the rst rendezvous, that is,
Z := min ({ i : pi(τA(i)) = τB(i) } ∪ {n+ 1}) .
Note that here τA, τB are xed, so Z depends only on the random choice of the binding pi; formally, Z is
pi-measurable. Then
W (τB, τB) = EZ.
Observe that Z is a random variable with values in {1, 2, . . . , n+ 1}, hence we have
EZ =
n∑
k=0
P(Z > k).
Note that we have Z > k if and only if during the rst k rounds the players did not meet. Clearly, during
every xed round, the players meet with probability 1n . Hence, by the union bound, the probability that
they do not meet during the rst k rounds is at least 1− kn . On the other hand, by the assumption of the
lemma, this probability is also at least β. We conclude that
P(Z > k) > max
(
1− k
n
, β
)
for all k ∈ [n].
By combining the above observations it follows that
W (τA, τB) =
n∑
k=0
P(Z > k) >
n∑
k=0
max
(
1− k
n
, β
)
=
n∑
k=0
(
1− k
n
)
+
n∑
k=0
max
(
0, β −
(
1− k
n
))
= n+ 12 +
n∑
k=d(1−β)ne
(
β −
(
1− k
n
))
= n+ 12 + (β − 1) · (n− d(1− β)ne+ 1) +
1
n
· n+ d(1− β)ne2 · (n− d(1− β)ne+ 1)
= n+ 12 + (n− d(1− β)ne+ 1) ·
(
β + d(1− β)ne − n2n
)
> n+ 12 + βn ·
β
2 =
n+ 1
2 +
β2
2 · n.
This concludes the proof. 
Thus, by Lemma 5, for the proof of Lemma 4 it suces to show that the probability that no rendezvous
occurs throughout the n rounds of the game is bounded away from zero.
3.3 High variance gives high probability of no rendezvous
Fix a pair of tactics τA, τB ∈ Θ. Let
F := {(τA(i), τB(i)) : i ∈ [n]} ⊆ [n]× [n].
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Set m := |F | and note that m 6 n. Similarly, for the random binding pi, let
E(pi) := {(i, pi(i)) : i ∈ [n]} ⊆ [n]× [n].
For f ∈ F , let Xf be the indicator random variable taking value 1 if f ∈ E(pi) and 0 otherwise. Further, let
X := |F ∩ E(pi)| =
∑
f∈F
Xf .
Note that here τA, τB are considered xed and pi is drawn at random, hence (Xf )f∈F and therefore X
depend only on the choice of the random binding pi; formally, these variables are pi-measurable. Observe
that the probability that no rendezvous occurs can be understood in terms of the random variable X as
follows:
P (τA(pi(i)) 6= τB(i) for all i ∈ [n]) = P(X = 0). (6)
From now on, we adopt the above notation whenever the pair of tactics τA, τB is clear from the context.
The next lemma is the key conceptual step in the proof. We show that in order to give a lower bound
on the probability that no rendezvous occurs, it suces to give a lower bound on the variance of X .
Lemma 6. Suppose τA, τB ∈ Θ are such that
m >
(
1−
√
α/2
)
· n and VarX > α,
for some constant α > 0. Then
P(X = 0) > α
2
128 .
The proof of Lemma 6 spans the rest of this section. The intuition is that high variance of X means
that X is not well concentrated around its mean, which in turns implies that the probability of it being
below the mean — equivalently equal to 0 — is high. Hence, we need to understand the mean of X as well
as estimate its higher moments.
Observe that if f = (i, j) ∈ F , then the probability that pi(i) = j is equal to 1n . Hence, Xf takes value 1
with probability 1n and 0 with probability 1− 1n . Consequently, we have
EXf =
1
n
for each f ∈ F.
By linearity of expectation,
EX = m
n
6 1.
In the sequel we will also need an upper bound on the fourth central moment of X , that is, on E|X −EX|4.
To this end, we rst establish, in the next two assertions, an upper bound on the fourth moment of X , that
is, on EX4.
Assertion 1. For pairwise dierent pairs e, f, g, h ∈ F , we have
EXeXf 6
1
n(n− 1)
EXeXfXg 6
1
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
EXeXfXgXh 6
1
n(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3) .
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Proof. Let us focus on the rst inequality. Write e = (i, j) and f = (i′, j′). Observe that if i = i′
or j = j′, then Xe and Xf cannot simultaneously be equal to 1 since e 6= f , and hence XeXf = 0 surely.
Otherwise, the probability that for pi chosen uniformly at random we have pi(i) = j and pi(i′) = j′ is 1n(n−1) .
Consequently P(XeXf = 1) = 1n(n−1) . This implies the rst inequality. The proofs of the remaining two
inequalities are analogous. 
Assertion 2. It holds that
EX4 6 15.
Proof. For each e ∈ F , since Xe ∈ {0, 1} we have Xe = X2e = X3e = X4e . By Assertion 1 and the fact
that m 6 n, we have
EX4 = E
(∑
e∈F
Xe
)4
=
∑
e∈F
EX4e +
∑
{e,f}⊆F
E(4X3eXf + 6X2eX2f + 4XeX3f )
+
∑
{e,f,g}⊆F
E(12X2eXfXg + 12XeX2fXg + 12XeXfX2g )
+
∑
{e,f,g,h}⊆F
E(24XeXfXgXh)
=
∑
e∈F
EXe + 14
∑
{e,f}⊆F
EXeXf
+36
∑
{e,f,g}⊆F
EXeXfXg + 24
∑
{e,f,g,h}⊆F
EXeXfXgXh
6 m
n
+ 14 ·
(m
2
)
n(n− 1) + 36 ·
(m
3
)
n(n− 1)(n− 2) + 24 ·
(m
4
)
n(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
6 1 + 7 + 6 + 1 = 15.
This concludes the proof. 
We will also use the following well-known anti-concentration inequality.
Theorem 7 (Paley-Zygmund inequality, [7]). Let Z be a non-negative random variable with nite vari-
ance and let λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then
P(Z > λEZ) > (1− λ)2 · (EZ)
2
EZ2
.
With all the tools prepared, we proceed with the proof of Lemma 6. We use Theorem 7 with λ = 12 for
the random variable
Z := |X − EX|2.
By Assertion 2 and the fact that EX 6 1, we have
EZ2 = E|X − EX|4 6 1 + EX4 6 16.
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As EZ = VarX > α, from Theorem 7 we infer that
P (Z > α/2) > P (Z > EZ/2) > 14 ·
(EZ)2
16 >
1
4 ·
α2
16 =
α2
64 . (7)
Observe now that the assumption that m >
(
1−√α/2) · n implies that
1− EX = 1− m
n
<
√
α/2.
This, in turns, implies that the event {
|X − EX|2 > α/2
}
is disjoint with the event {X = 1}. By combining this with (7), we conclude that
P(X 6= 1) > P
(
|X − EX|2 > α/2
)
= P (Z > α/2) > α
2
64 .
Since X is a non-negative integer-valued random variable with mean not larger than 1, we have
P(X 6= 1) = P(X = 0) + P(X > 2) and P(X = 0) > P(X > 2).
By combining the two inequalities above we conclude that
P(X = 0) > 12 · P(X 6= 1) >
α2
128 .
This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.
3.4 Many disjoint pairs give high variance
Two pairs (i, j) and (i′, j′), each in [n]× [n], are disjoint if i 6= i′ and j 6= j′. We now prove that to ensure
that for a pair of tactics τA, τB , the variance of X is high, it suces to show that among pairs in F , there is
a quadratic number of pairs of pairs that are disjoint.
Lemma 8. Suppose τA, τB ∈ Θ are such that there are at least α
(n
2
)
disjoint pairs in F , for some positive
constant α. Then VarX > α.
Proof. As in the proof of Assertion 1, we observe that for every pair of dierent elements e, f ∈ F , we
have
EXeXf =

1
n(n−1) if e and f are disjoint;
0 otherwise.
Therefore, for all dierent e, f ∈ F we have
VarXe = EX2e − (EXe)2 =
n− 1
n2
, and
Cov(Xe, Xf ) = EXeXf − EXeEXf = [e ∩ f = ∅] · 1
n(n− 1) −
1
n2
,
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where the expression [e ∩ f = ∅] takes value 1 if e and f are disjoint, and 0 otherwise. Consequently,
VarX =
∑
e∈F
VarXe + 2 ·
∑
{e,f}⊆F
Cov(Xe, Xf )
> m · n− 1
n2
− 2 ·
(
m
2
)
· 1
n2
+ 2 · α
(
n
2
)
· 1
n(n− 1)
= m(n− 1)−m(m− 1)
n2
+ α,
which is at least α because m 6 n. This concludes the proof. 
3.5 Finding many disjoint pairs
Finally, we prove that if τA and τB are two tactics of the same kind, then the set of pairs F dened for τA
and τB contains many pairs of disjoint pairs. For this, it will be convenient to interpret F as the edge set of
a bipartite graph, with each side of the bipartition consisting of a copy of the set [n]. In this view, a pair
of disjoint pairs corresponds to a pair of disjoint edges: two edges in a graph being disjoint if all the four
endpoints of these edges are pairwise dierent.
We rst prove the following graph-theoretic lemma. The degree deg(u) of a vertex u in a graph G is
the number of edges of G incident to u.
Lemma 9. Let G = (A,B,E) be a bipartite graph such that A and B — the sides of the bipartition — have
size n each, 1112n 6 |E| 6 n, and the degree of each vertex in G is at most 23n. Then there are two disjoint
subsets of edges E1, E2 ⊆ E, each of size at least n/8, such that every edge from E1 is disjoint with every
edge in E2.
Proof. For X ⊆ A ∪B, we let deg(X) := ∑u∈X deg(u).
Let a1, . . . , an be the vertices of A in non-increasing order with respect to their degrees. Let t ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n} be the largest index such that A1 := {a1, . . . , at} satises deg(A1) 6 23n. Since the degree
of every vertex is at most 23n and |E| > 23n, we know that neither A1 nor A2 := A \A1 is empty. In other
words, t ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}. Further, since deg(A1) 6 23n, deg(A1∪{at+1}) > 23n, and deg(at+1) 6 deg(v)
for every v ∈ A1, it follows that deg(A1) > n/3. Since deg(A1) 6 23n, and deg(A) = |E| > 1112n, we also
have deg(A2) > n/4. We conclude that we have found a partition A1 unionmultiA2 of A such that
deg(A1) > n/4 and deg(A2) > n/4.
Symmetrically, we can nd a partition B1 unionmultiB2 of B such that
deg(B1) > n/4 and deg(B2) > n/4.
For all s, t ∈ {1, 2}, let Fst be the set of all edges from E with one endpoint in As and the other in Bt,
and set mst := |Fst|. The above lower bounds on the degrees of A1, A2, B1, B2 imply that
m11 +m12 > n/4, m21 +m22 > n/4, m11 +m21 > n/4, m12 +m22 > n/4. (8)
Observe that if m11 > n/8 and m22 > n/8, then E1 = F11 and E2 = F22 satisfy the condition from
the lemma statement. Similarly, if m12 > n/8 and m21 > n/8, then taking E1 = F12 and E2 = F21
concludes the proof. We are thus left with the case when there is st ∈ {11, 22} such that mst < n/8 and
there is s′t′ ∈ {12, 21} such that ms′t′ < n/8. But then mst +ms′t′ < n/4, which contradicts one of the
inequalities (8). 
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From Lemma 9 we immediately infer the following result.
Lemma 10. Suppose that τA, τB ∈ Θ is a pair of tactics such that τA, τB ∈ ΘA or τA, τB ∈ ΘP, and that
|F | > 1112n. Then VarX > 132 .
Proof. Let G = (A,B, F ) be the bipartite graph constructed by taking A and B to be two disjoint copies
of the set [n], and interpreting each pair (i, j) ∈ F as an edge that connects the copy of i inA with the copy
of j in B. We now verify that G satises the prerequisites of Lemma 9. We have |F | > 1112n by assumption,
so we are left with checking the requirements on degrees.
Suppose rst τA, τB ∈ ΘA. Then |τA([n])| 6 n/2, so there are only at most n/2 indices i ∈ [n] that
may be the rst coordinates of pairs from F . Hence in G, the degree of every vertex in B is at most n/2. A
symmetric reasoning shows that the degree of every vertex in A is at most n/2.
Suppose now that τA, τB ∈ ΘP. Then |τA([n])| > n/2, hence there are at least n+12 indices i ∈ [n] that
are the rst coordinates of pairs from F . Every i ∈ [n] is the rst coordinate of at most n+12 pairs from F .
Indeed, otherwise it would not be possible that each of the at least n−12 indices i
′ ∈ τA([n]) \ {i} would be
the rst coordinate of one of the remaining less than n−12 pairs from F . This means that in G, the degree of
each vertex from A is at most n+12 6
2
3n. A symmetric reasoning shows that the degree of each vertex
from B is at most 23n.
Having veried the prerequisites of Lemma 9, we can conclude that there exist disjoint subsets of
pairs F1, F2 ⊆ F , each of size at least n/8, such that every pair from F1 is disjoint with every pair from F2.
This implies that in F there are at least n264 >
1
32 ·
(n
2
)
pairs of pairs that are disjoint. By Lemma 8, this
implies that VarX > 132 . 
3.6 Wrapping up the proof
With all the tools prepared, we are now in a position to prove Lemma 4.
Proof (of Lemma 4). Let F , m, and X be dened for τA, τB as in Section 3.3.
We rst consider the corner case when m 6 1112n. Then
EX = m
n
6 1112 .
Therefore, by Markov’s inequality we infer that
P(X = 0) = 1− P(X > 1) > 1− 1112 =
1
12 .
Now consider the case when m > 1112n. By Lemma 10 we infer that VarX >
1
32 . Applying Lemma 6 for
α = 132 , we conclude that in this case
P(X = 0) > 1128 · 322 = 2
−17.
Note here that the assumption m >
(
1−√α/2) · n is satised, because 1−√α/2 = 78 < 1112 .
Hence, we have P(X = 0) > 2−17 in both cases. By Lemma 5 we now conclude that
W (τA, τB) >
n+ 1
2 + 2
−35 · n.
Hence, Lemma 4 holds for δ = 2−35. 
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Recalling that the proof of Theorem 1 sets ε to be δ/2, we conclude that Theorem 1 holds for ε = 2−36.
Acknowledgements. The last author thanks Amos Korman for stimulating discussions on the rendezvous
problem in general.
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